Ad Hoc Network Scenarios and Different Types of Attacks by Rexa, Denis
BRNO UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
VYSOKÉ UČENÍ TECHNICKÉ V BRNĚ
FACULTY OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND
COMMUNICATION
FAKULTA ELEKTROTECHNIKY
A KOMUNIKAČNÍCH TECHNOLOGIÍ
DEPARTMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ÚSTAV TELEKOMUNIKACÍ
AD HOC NETWORK SCENARIOS AND DIFFERENT TYPES
OF ATTACKS
USPOŘÁDÁNÍ AD HOC SÍTÍ A RŮZNÉ TYPY ÚTOKŮ
BACHELOR'S THESIS
BAKALÁŘSKÁ PRÁCE
AUTHOR
AUTOR PRÁCE
Denis Rexa
SUPERVISOR
VEDOUCÍ PRÁCE
doc. Ing. Vladislav Škorpil, CSc.
BRNO 2016
Fakulta elektrotechniky a komunikačních technologií, Vysoké učení technické v Brně / Technická 3058/10 / 616 00 / Brno
Bakalářská práce
bakalářský studijní obor Teleinformatika
Ústav telekomunikací
Student: Denis Rexa ID: 164383
Ročník: 3 Akademický rok: 2015/16
NÁZEV TÉMATU:
Uspořádání ad hoc sítí a různé typy útoků
POKYNY PRO VYPRACOVÁNÍ:
Věnujte se vlastnostem MANET sítí a možnostem simulačního programu NS3. Prostudujte a teoreticky zpracujte
nejrozšířenější hrozby pro MANET (ad hoc) sítě a popište problém "broadcast storm" v ad hoc sítích. V další části
práce MANET síť simulujte, demonstrujte útoky na datový provoz a v dané topologii je ovlivňujte. Na základě
získaných poznatků navrhněte možnosti snížení dopadu útoků na síť.
DOPORUČENÁ LITERATURA:
[1] BHATTACHARYYA, A., BANERJEE, A., BOSE, D., SAHA, H., N., BHATTACHARJEE, D. Different types of
a t t a c k s  i n  M o b i l e  ADHOC  N e t w o r k :  P r e v e n t i o n  a n d  m i t i g a t i o n  t e c h n i q u e s .
https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmfXH9XtP7xmoTH8WAp4HNSduqWMwLTH8B8TvbTkdgzNAa/cc-by-nc-sa-3.0/1111/1111.40
90.pdf
[2] LI, W., JOSHI, A. Security Issues in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks - A Survey.
http://www.csee.umbc.edu/~wenjia1/699_report.pdf
[3] ŞEN, S., CLARK, J., A., TAPIADOR, J., E... Security Threats in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks.
https://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/~jac/PublishedPapers/SecurityThreats%20in%20MANEs.pdf
Termín zadání: 1.2.2016 Termín odevzdání: 1.6.2016
Vedoucí práce:     doc. Ing. Vladislav Škorpil, CSc.
Konzultant bakalářské práce:     
doc. Ing. Jiří Mišurec, CSc., předseda oborové rady
UPOZORNĚNÍ:
Autor bakalářské práce nesmí při vytváření bakalářské práce porušit autorská práva třetích osob, zejména nesmí zasahovat nedovoleným
způsobem do cizích autorských práv osobnostních a musí si být plně vědom následků porušení ustanovení § 11 a následujících autorského
zákona č. 121/2000 Sb., včetně možných trestněprávních důsledků vyplývajících z ustanovení části druhé, hlavy VI. díl 4 Trestního zákoníku
č.40/2009 Sb.
 Faculty of Electrical Engineering 
and Communication 
Brno University of Technology 
Technicka 12, CZ-61600 Brno, Czechia 
http://www.six.feec.vutbr.cz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research described in this bachelor thesis has been done in laboratories supported by Sensor, 
Information and Communication Systems Research Centre (SIX) project; registration number 
CZ.1.05/2.1.00/03.0072 Operational Program Research and Development for Innovation (operační 
program Výzkum a vývoj pro inovace). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstrakt  
 V tejto semestrálnej práci venovanej sieťam MANET a ich bezpečnostným hrozbám sa v prvej 
kapitole preberajú vlastnosti sieti MANET a porovnávajú sa smerovacie protokoly AODV vs OLSR vs 
ZRP ako zástupci proaktívneho, reaktívneho a hybridného smerovania so spomenutou hlavnou 
charakteristikou s výhodami a nevýhodami jeho využitia. 
 Ďalej je spomínaný “broadcast storm” a podrobnejšie rozobrané základné typy útokov v 
sieťach MANET rozdelené do skupín Data traffic (Black-hole, Cooperative Black-hole, Gray-hole) a 
Control traffic (Hello flood, Wormhole a Rushing Attack) s návrhmi na potlačenie vplyvu na fungovanie 
siete. 
 V nasledujúcej kapitole je ukazané a popisané prostredie NS-3 simulátora, konkrétnejšie vo 
verzii 3.21 s uvedeným jednoduchým programom, z ktorého som neskôr vychádzal + spôsoby, ako 
získať údaje zo simulácie + ukážka topológie mnou vytvorenej siete v nadstavbe NetAnim vo verzii 
3.105. 
 Posledná kapitola ukazuje dopad black-hole a gray-hole útoku na sieť s vlastným návrhom 
implementácie v zdrovojom kóde. V záveru každej podkapitoly je spomenutý návrh na potlačenie 
vplyvu útoku na sieť. 
 Cieľom tejto práce je vytvorenie simulovanej siete s implementovaným ad-hoc smerovacím 
protokolom s viacerými uzlami s nastavenou fixnou mobilitou (keďže pozorovanie pohybových 
modelov nie je cieľom tejto práce) a skúmať dopad black-hole and gray-hole útokov na sieť. Pri 
simulacií black-hole (BH) som využil ako základ jednoduchú sieť s dodaním možnosti aktivácie BH 
pomocou príkazového riadku. V tom prípade napadnutý uzol v nastavený čas začne nepresmerovávať 
pakety, sieť je teoreticky rozdelená na dve časti a strata paketov pri pokuse o preposlanie cez 
napadnutý uzol je rovná 100%. Pri aplikovaní BH som nešiel cestou stopnutia presmerovovávania 
paketov, ale „zhodenia“ uzlu. Keďže som sa po mnohým bezúspešných pokusoch o implementáciu 
správnej funkcie na fórach ns-3 užívateľov dozvedel, že daná funckia SetForwarding nefunguje správne 
a jedná sa chybu softwaru. 
 Pri simulácií gray-hole útoku (GH) som sa sústredil hlavne na môj vlastný návrh implementácie 
do zdrojového kódu. Vybral som si variantu – „node dependency” attack kedy sa pakety filtrujú na 
základe IP adresy alebo aj portu. Keďže som neobjavil funkčný spôsob akým možno filtrovať 
komunikáciu medzi uzlami generovanú aplikáciou, bol som sa nútený pristupovať k paketom ako 
objektom a generovať ich manuálne. Musím priznať, že tento spôsob plne neodpovedá myšlienke GH, 
keďže som posielal pakety cez uzol, ktorý pakety filtroval, ale vytvoril som ho ako server. To znamená, 
že pri preposlaní do cieľovej adresy v hlavičke paketu figuruje cieľová adresa prostredného servera 
a nie skutočného odosieľatela. Výsledky práce nemám vyjadrené percentuálne, keďže pakety boli 
generované manuálne a tým pádom nešlo o plnohodnotnú komunikáciu medzi účastníkmi. 
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Abstract 
 In this semester thesis dedicated to MANET networks and security threats are compared the 
routing protocols AODV vs OLSR vs ZRP. Next chapter is dealing with a broadcast storm and discussed 
in more detail basic types of attacks in MANET networks with proposals to suppress the impact on the 
functioning of the network. In the next chapter, it is shown and described an environment of NS-3 
simulator with that program and simple way how to reach the information. The last chapter shows 
the influence of black-hole and gray-hole attack on the network, and a proposal for its elimination. 
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Introduction 
 Mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is getting increasingly used on daily based. People require 
to be independent on fixed infrastructure and be online whenever they want to be. In my thesis will 
be discussed advantages and disadvantages of this kind of network and threats connected with it. As 
a main characteristic feature, I would mention that MANET is self-configuring system without any base 
station.  
 The goal of this thesis conveys sample of the impact of attack (respectively the threat in 
general), on the topology in the simulator NS-3 (free software, publicly available under the GNU GPLv2 
license for research, development and use [3]). It doesn’t dispose a graphical user interface in which 
the simulation could be created, but it’s running in the form of source code, which is based on C ++ or 
Python. 
 First chapter is dealing with MANET network basic features, routing techniques using within 
the whole internet. There are compared routing protocols designed for MANET, which are divided 
among 3 groups according to their behaviour.  
 In Next chapter, there was chosen a representative from every group of MANET protocols and 
this chapter devoted to comparison AODV vs OLSR vs ZRP summarizes main characteristics of each 
protocol. There are chosen also recommendation contained for which types of network protocols will 
be given protocol the most effective. 
 The following chapter theoretically discusses the impact of broadcast storm on the topology 
and are mentioned also attacks such as black-hole or gray-hole with proposals to eliminate their 
influence. 
 The most extensive chapter is devoted to creating a model in the network simulator, 
implementation of applications with setting of parameters and also there is the description of creation 
individual parts of the network. Everything is detailed shown and explained on the code sample. 
 The last chapter is dealing with the impact of black-hole and gray-hole attack on continuity of 
flowing of the packets and it contains a proposal how to mitigate the influence of the attack. 
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1 MANET network 
 Perhaps the most widespread notion of a mobile ad hoc network is a network formed without 
any central administration which consists of mobile nodes that use a wireless interface to send packet 
data. The roots of ad hoc networking can be traced back as far as 1968, when work on the ALOHA 
network was initiated (the objective of this network was to connect educational facilities in Hawaii). 
[11]. The ALOHA protocol worked as a single hop protocol without any routing option, not suitable for 
commercial using. Inspired by the ALOHA network and the early development of fixed network packet 
switching, DARPA began work, in 1973, on the PRnet (packet radio network)—a multihop network 
[11] In the eighties, DARPA declassified it for no military purpose. 
 We understand by the term ad-hoc that two equal nodes establish the connection temporarily 
without any centralized node or base station. Self-configuring feature is one of the most significant 
criterion because the environment and topology is changing constantly and dynamically. It is widely 
used in military purpose, disaster area, personal area network and so on. [9] First ad-hoc network was 
build up in 70’s, however, the mobility of system was not integrated into the system. This problem 
was resolved only in the last several years due to major advances in radio communications. [6] 
1.1 MANET features 
 This network is such as flexible solution, therefore it’s suitable for areas where developing the 
infrastructure is not worth. A mobile ad hoc network (or simply MANET throughout this paper) has 
some special features which we should take into account while developing the algorithm: 
 It is a self-configuring network which is composed of several movable user 
equipment.  
 It does not rely on any fixed infrastructure, connected by wireless links/cables 
 lack of base station or centralized administration 
 unidirectional or bidirectional connection 
 possibility to connect with fixed infrastructure via gateway [6] 
 disadvantages of wireless networks-  sensitive to noise and interference 
 fluctuating link capacity: the effects of high bit-error rates might be more profound 
in a multihop ad hoc network, since the aggregate of all link errors is what affects a 
multihop path. [11] 
 MANET node have to rely on itself as regards a security or routing 
 low-power devices: CPU processing, memory size/usage, signal processing, and 
transceiver output/input power. All of these are power-consuming components in a 
device and thus, the algorithms and mechanisms that implement the networking 
functions should be optimized for lean power consumption [11] 
1.2 Routing in general 
 Routing is described as a process of selection best path how to get to the destination. What is 
the most suitable path the router decides with implemented routing protocols.  The routing process 
usually directs forwarding on the basis of routing tables, which maintain a record of the routes to 
various network destinations. Thus, constructing routing tables, which are held in the router's 
memory, is very important for efficient routing. Most routing algorithms use only one network path 
at a time. [12] 
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1.2.1 Static routing  
 Routing method when router uses a manually-configured routing entry. Routers do not 
examine the network, they don’t communicate with each other and their routing table are built up by 
administrator by adding in entries into. Unlike dynamic routing, the routes are fixed and if topology 
changed, the administrator will have to rebuild the routing table every time. This technique is 
employed very rarely, because of a duration of rebuilding. 
1.2.2 Dynamic routing  
 Unlike static routing, dynamic routing enables routers to select paths according to real-time 
topology changes. Router is responsible for the creation, maintenance and updating of the dynamic 
routing table and resend the actualization to its neighbours. 
 We can divide them into two essential group: 
 IGP (Interior Gateway Protocol)- for routing within the autonomy area; protocols RIP, 
EIGRP, OSPF 
 EGP (Exterior Gateway Protocol)- for routing out of the autonomy area; protocols 
BGP, EGP3 (it won’t be mentioned below) 
Routing protocols IGP 
 Distance Vector (DV): 
 best way= lowest number of hops 
 sending the routing table periodically 
 it doesn’t know whole topology 
 lower performance needed 
 Link State (LS): 
 it knows whole topology 
 maintain topology database, which are updated via LSA (Link-State Advertisement) 
messages 
 higher performance for processing the received information needed 
 service messages for updating information are sent only if some topology changes or 
failure occur  
1.3 Routing in MANET 
 In extensive topologies might happen that between two different nodes can exist more than 
one path, known as redundancy. For cases if some troubles with the nodes occur, packet will be sent 
via backup path. Routing within MANET network faces to challenging task because the nodes can move 
randomly within the network. An optimal path to destination are changing every moment, and given 
path consider as a best one might not work several seconds later. 
 Likely dynamic protocols, we can divide them into two essential group: 
 Connection-oriented protocols- the path is known before sending data  
 Connectionless protocols – the optimal path will be chosen after sending and the 
source node don’t need to obtain information about successfully received data  
MANET routing protocols are divided among: 1) table-driven (proactive) routing, 2) on-demand 
(reactive) routing, 3) hybrid (both proactive and reactive) routing 
13 
 
 
     Pict. 1: Dividing the protocols  
1.3.1 Proactive routing 
 Proactive, in terms of routing in MANET, means each node is actively mapping the topology 
and the paths to the destination are selected before sending data- compiled routing tables which are 
periodically updated. The individual routes are calculated, even if that do not affect the functioning of 
the network. [6] 
 Node contains the number of hops required to arrive that particular destination node, 
generation of new sequence number marked by the destination and the destination address. The 
proactive protocols are appropriate for less number of nodes in networks, as they need to update 
node entries for each and every node in the routing table of every node. It results more Routing 
overhead problem. There is consumption of more bandwidth in routing table. [13] Among proactive 
protocols belong protocols such as DSDV, OLSR, FSR and WRP. 
1.3.2 Reactive routing 
 Unlike active routing, in reactive protocols, routes are determined on demand. It uses flooding 
concept and exploring the topology in order to get latest routing table is not required. Finding out 
process for the optimal path to the destination works on the principle the flooding request message 
(RREQ) and reply (RREP). No need to look the way for each packet, so that it is assumed that the path 
is available throughout the broadcast. [6] 
 We have to take into account higher delay because of on demand routing. But on the other 
hand, reactive protocol has lower overhead with minimum service messages-> not wasting with 
bandwidth. Among reactive protocols belong protocols such as DRS, AODV and ADV. 
1.3.3 Hybrid routing 
 This combines the advantages of both- proactive and reactive protocol. It was proposed to 
reduce the control overhead of proactive routing protocols and also decrease the latency caused by 
route discovery in reactive routing protocols. [14] The nearby nodes are trying to find ways 
immediately, which are regularly updated. Routes to remote nodes are created at the moment when 
it is required [6]. Hybrid protocols are for instance ZRP (Zone routing protocol) and TORA (Temporarily 
Ordered Routing Algorithm).  
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2 AODV vs OSLR vs ZRP protocols 
 It was chosen a representative from every group and their features are going to be compared 
in following chapter. 
2.1 AODV protocol (Ad-Hoc On Demand Distance 
Vector Routing) 
 AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) was developed on July 2003 in Nokia Research 
Center, University of California, Santa Barbara and University of Cincinnati by C. Perkins, E. Belding-
Royer and S. Das. [15] As it was mentioned, routes are determined on demand, which causes control 
traffic overhead to be dynamic. It will result in initial the delay. 
2.1.1 Main characteristic of AODV 
 For as long as a route exists between two endpoints, AODV remains passive. When the route 
becomes invalid or lost, AODV will again issue a request. [16] 
 Searching the path starts with broadcasting HELLO message with set TTL (Time To Live) value 
to 1 what ensures receiving only by the neighbours. This messages is going to be forwarded 
to each of remote neighbours, until one of them does not know the way. During forwarding 
the RREQ packet is marked where it came from. On the base of this data is created “map” and 
sent the answer- RREP (Route Reply). [6] 
 If the path become invalid before time expires, it sends a message RERR (Route Error) to the 
neighbours, which took part on the forwarding, to clear all roads that were using the 
questionable part of the route [6] 
2.1.2 Advantages of AODV 
 Less system messages 
 More suitable for smaller topologies 
 sequential numbers guarantee that the information is up to date [6] 
2.1.3 Disadvantages of AODV 
 Delay of packets 
 Demanding implementation of QoS – RREP and RREQ have to carry more information 
(bandwidth, delay,…) [6] 
2.2 OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing) 
 OLSR is a proactive link-state routing protocol, which uses hello and topology control (TC) 
messages to discover and then disseminate link state information throughout the mobile ad hoc 
network. Individual nodes use this topology information to compute next hop destinations for all 
nodes in the network using shortest hop forwarding paths. [17] 
 Using Hello messages, the OLSR protocol at each node discovers 2-hop neighbour information 
and performs a distributed election of a set of multipoint relays (MPRs). [17] MPRs node must comply 
with conditions such as existing a path to each of its 2-hop neighbours via this node. Their role is to 
source and forward TC messages. 
15 
 
2.2.1 Main characteristic of OLSR 
 Neighbour sensing: each node periodically broadcasts HELLO messages (it contains list of 
neighbours, where there exists a valid bidirectional connection + list of the neighbours, which 
have heard about this node). All one-hop neighbours receive these HELLO packets (TTL is set 
up to 2) 
 MPR Declaration: in order to build the intra-forwarding database needed for routing packets, 
each node broadcasts specific control messages called topology control (TC) messages. [18] It 
contains list of MPR nodes. MPR spread this information within the network through other 
MPR nodes. 
 Routing tables is build up on base of address found in TC messages 
2.2.2 Advantages of OLSR 
 suitable for widespread topologies  
 frequently sending of TC messages reduce loop [6] 
 Easy to implement QoS - extension to the QoSLR - measurement of important parameters 
quality services, such as delay, delay variation, bandwidth etc., 
2.2.3 Disadvantages of OSLR 
 Impact of using MPR’s for small network is minimal 
 require relative much storage and performance (maintained information about the entire 
network) 
 routes, which may never be used, are maintained  
2.3 ZRP (Zone Routing Protocol) 
 ZRP, as a hybrid routing protocol, takes the advantages of both worlds. It was designed by 
Zygmunt Haas of Cornell University to speed up delivery of packets and reduce processing overhead 
by selecting the most suitable route. ZRP relies on two different protocols: Intra-zone Routing Protocol 
(IARP) for proactive routing within the zones, Inter-zone Routing Protocol (IERP) for reactive routing 
outside of the zones and BRP is responsible for forwarding IERP route queries to the peripheral nodes 
of the broadcasting node. Although the receivers of a broadcast packet are the peripheral nodes, the 
BRP deliver the query to the IERP at every hop. [19] 
2.3.1 Main characteristic of ZRP 
 each node individually creates its own zone (contains of the nearest neighbours) 
 if destination is located in the same zone as the origin  using proactive protocol and its 
already stored routing table 
 if destination is out of the zone  reactive protocol checks each successive zone to find if the 
destination is located inside that zone. If is the location in that specific zone confirmed it is 
employed for delivering the packet (on-demand search) 
 targeted to large networks 
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2.3.2 Advantages of ZRP 
 finds free loop routes to the destination 
 ZRP generate less traffic amount compared to pure proactive or reactive routing 
 only local effect when network topology change 
2.3.3 Disadvantages of ZRP 
 impossibility to resize the zone 
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3 Ad Hoc problems and threats 
 In this chapter, we are going to discuss the potential threats/ problems of a mobile ad hoc 
network (MANET) and explore their current solutions. Access points, base stations or centralized 
administration is missing, therefore security of ad hoc network becomes inherent weakness. In the 
end, it will be suggested a solution to mitigate, respectively to eliminate the impact of threats on the 
topology. 
3.1 The Broadcast Storm 
 Broadcasting is a common operation in a network to resolve many issues. Because radio 
signals are likely to overlap with others in a geographical area, a straightforward broadcasting by 
flooding is usually very costly and will result in serious redundancy, contention, and collision, to which 
we refer as the broadcast storm problem. [4] MANET network relies on sending broadcast messages 
to solve many layer problems, graph-related problems and distributed computing problems as well 
and each host use CSMA/CA (carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance) transceiver. Due 
to host mobility, broadcasting is performed more frequently because of sending the alarm messages, 
finding the next hop host and paging new hosts. 
 Attempts for synchronizations in such a network with mobility and broadcast topology 
information is unavailable. Therefore, broadcasting by flooding seems as the most feasible method. 
However, we have to take into account several complications connected with the MANET 
broadcasting: 
1) multiple physical locations may be covered by the broadcasting of the other hosts as a 
cause of the omnidirectional propagation 
2) many redundant rebroadcasts 
3) rebroadcasting hosts, which are too close each other within the topology may cause heavy 
arguments 
4) collisions are more likely to occur because the RTS/CTS (Request to Send / Clear to Send) 
dialogue is inapplicable and the timing of rebroadcasts is highly correlated [4] 
MANET broadcasting is spontaneous and unreliable. It means there is not any mechanism for 
control of timing and hosts can broadcast message whenever they want. The host may miss the 
message because it is off-line, it is temporarily isolated from the network, or it experiences repetitive 
collisions, acknowledgements may cause serious medium contention (and thus another “storm”) 
surrounding the sender, and in many applications a 100% reliable broadcast is unnecessary. [4] 
 CSMAICA network, drawbacks of flooding include: 
 Redundant rebroadcasts: When a mobile host decides to rebroadcast a broadcast 
message to its neighbours, all its neighbours already have the message. 
  Contention: After a mobile host broadcasts a message, if many of its neighbours decide 
to rebroadcast the message, these transmissions (which are all from nearby hosts) may 
severely contend with each other. 
   Collision: Because of the deficiency of back-off mechanism, the lack of RTS/CTS dialogue, 
and the absence of CD, collisions are more likely to occur and cause more damage. [4] 
 Following analysis on redundant rebroadcasts show how much costly and inefficient would be 
using the rebroadcasting. Therefore, it would be used with caution. Let's say we have two points, A 
and B, spaced apart d distance. Node A wants to broadcast the message and B’s role is to forward the 
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message. Let be r be radii area of A and B, SA and SB would be considered as circle areas covered by 
A’s and B’s transmissions. We can derive, that the additional area that can benefit from B’s 
rebroadcast is given by following equations. 
 
|𝑆𝐴−𝐵| =  𝜋𝑟
2 − 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑇(𝑑)     (1) 
      𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑇(𝑑) =  4 ∗  ∫ √𝑟2 − 𝑥2 𝑑𝑥
𝑟
𝑑/2
    (2) 
If d=r, the coverage area |SB-A| is the largest. Rebroadcast can provide only 0~ 61% additional coverage 
over in compare with the previous transmission. 
Let’s analyse the case of contention of n=2. Consider the situation, when host A broadcast the 
message and there are hosts B and C receiving this message. Let B locate at A’s area and in order for 
C to contend with B, it must be situated within the intersection of A’s and B’s transmission ranges. B. 
So the probability of contention is  
|𝑆𝐴∩𝐵|/ 𝜋𝑟
2       (3)
      
 Let x be the distance between A and B. Integrating the above formula over the circle of radius 
x from 0 to r, the expected probability of contention is [4] 
        ∫
2𝜋𝑥∗𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑇(𝑥)/(𝜋𝑟2)
𝜋𝑟2
𝑟
0
     (4) 
In the analysis of collisions, firstly, will be explained the back-off procedure, because it’s 
necessary to understand it clearly. The back-off mechanism is an essential part of MAC protocol. If is 
the channel used by transmitting node at given time, the MAC protocol must get know to other hosts 
that the media is busy. In order to decide the length of node suspension, a back-off mechanism is 
installed in the MAC protocol. The choice of back-off mechanism should consider generating back-off 
timers which allow adequate time for current transmissions to finish and, at the same time, avoid 
unneeded idle time that leads to redundant delay in the network. [7] 
 We have to take into account that in MANET networks is no base station or access point. 
Therefore, we will focus mainly on the behaviour under the distributed coordinate function (DCF). The 
CSMA/CA mechanism requires a host to start a back-off procedure right after the host transmitted a 
message, or when a host wants to transmit but the medium is busy and the previous back-off has been 
done. If the channel clear assessment (CCA) mechanism of the host detects no channel activity during 
the past slot (a fixed period), the counter is decreased by one. When the counter reaches zero, the 
back-off procedure is finished. [4] 
Let’s imagine the scenario with several neighbour hosts hear broadcast from specific host H. 
There are few options where collisions may occur. 
 if in the neighbourhood of host H hasn’t occur any broadcasting, host H’s neighbours 
could have mistakenly think there is a free channel. After having passed the DIFS 
period, they may all start rebroadcasting at around the same time 
 because RTS/CTS is missing in a broadcast transmission, damage collisions may have 
more serious impact.  
 once collision occurs, without collision detection (CD), a host will keep transmitting 
the packet even if some of foregoing bits have been garbled. And the longer the 
packet is, the more the waste. [4] 
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3.2 Data Traffic Attacks 
 For better clarity, the existing attacks are categorized into two broad categories: DATA traffic 
and CONTROL traffic attacks. The following groups are based on their characteristics and attacks 
targets/ goals.  
 
    Pict. 2: Classification MANET attacks 
3.2.1 Black-Hole Attack [8]  
 A black hole problem means that one malicious node utilizes the routing protocol to claim 
itself of being the shortest path to the destination node, but drops the routing packets but does not 
forward packets to its neighbours. [9] Malicious node replies the RREQ packet sent from source node 
with a response, which says, that a malicious node has the quickest route to the destination node. As 
a result, the source starts erroneously sending all of the packets through the black-hole - dropping all 
data packets passing through it as like matter and energy disappears from our universe in a black hole. 
If the attacking node is a connecting node of two connecting components of that network, then it 
effectively separates the network in to two disconnected components. [8] 
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   Pict. 3: Sample of black-hole attack’s impact on given topology 
 Node infected with black-hole virus is a connecting node of two connecting components of 
that network, then it may effectively divide the topology into two separate disconnected parts as 
shown above. 
 Many different strategies to mitigate the impact were developed. Some of them will be 
described: 
(i) Neighbourhood-based and Routing Recovery Scheme [9] 
 Neighbourhood-based is used as a detection scheme to recognize a malicious node and 
routing recovery protocol’s role is to ensure the correct path. The source node sends the modify route 
entry control packet to correct (destination) node to rebuild routing path. In this scheme, not only a 
lower detection time and higher throughput are acquired, but the accurate detection probability is 
also achieved. [9] 
(ii) Redundant Route Method and Unique Sequence Number Scheme [9] 
As it was mentioned above, a malicious node acts as the quickest and most suitable route to 
the destination. First proposal, how to eliminate the black-hole is to find more than one route to the 
destination node. The source sends a RREQ (Route Request) packet to the destination. The receivers, 
who has route in their routing table to the destination will replies with RREP packet. The sender will 
stand by until he receives more than 2 RREP packets. He will reply after identifying a safe route. This 
route will be recognized from the numbers of hops or nodes. 
Second proposal, two values are needed to be recorded in two additional tables. One is the 
last-packet-sequence-numbers for the last packet sent to every node and the other is for the last 
packet received. When any packet is transmitted or received, these two tables will be updated 
automatically. According to these two table values, the sender node can identify whether there is 
malicious nodes or not. [9] 
As a result, both solutions produce less RREQ and RREP numbers than AODV protocol. 
Furthermore, solution two is better than solution one due to the sequence number included in every 
packet in the original routing protocol. The communication overhead can be eliminated by this 
solution because of the inbound cryptography method. [9]. However, I have to admit that it works for 
single black attack detection only. 
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(iii) Time-based Threshold Detection Scheme [9] 
 According to this method, packet’s sequence number will be stored jointly with the received 
time in a Collect Route Reply Table (CRRT). Then count the timeout based on the arriving time of first 
route request and decide if the path is valid or not according to above threshold value. 
3.2.2 Cooperative Black-Hole Attack [8]  
 Detect the cooperative black-hole attack is incomparable more demanding then mechanism 
for black-hole detection. Malicious nodes collaborate together in order to convince the victim about 
the authenticity of their fabricated routing information. Moreover, they hide from the existing 
detection scheme. As a result, several cooperative detection schemes are proposed preventing the 
collaborative black hole attacks [9]. 
(i) DRI Table and Cross Checking Scheme [9] 
Every node has to carry one more extra DRI table, 1 represents for true and 0 for false. The 
entry is composed of two bits, “From” and “Through” which stands for information on routing data 
packet from the node and through the node respectively. [9] 
Procedure starts when source node sends the RREQ packets to each node, which replies the 
RREP packet. The intermediate node (IN) transmits next hop node (NHN) and DRI table to the SN, then 
the SN cross checks its own table and the received DRI table to determine the IN’s honesty. After that, 
SN sends the further request to IN’s NHN for asking its routing information, including the current NHN, 
the NHN’s DRI table and its own DRI table. [9] Subsequently, the source node compares the received 
information by cross checking and decide if the given node is trustful or not. However, it wastes 5 to 
8% communication overhead, and slightly increases the packet loss percentage because of the secure 
route discovery delay [9], but it’s almost 50% better than other solutions 
(ii) Distributed Cooperative Mechanism (DCM) [9] 
Distributed Cooperative Mechanism consist of four sub-modules:  
 local data collection => 
 local detection => 
 cooperative detection => 
 global reaction.  
In the first phase, local data collection, an estimation table is constructed and maintained by 
each node in the network. Each node evaluates the information of overhearing packets to determine 
whether there is any malicious node. If there is one suspicious node, the detect node initiates the local 
detection phase to recognize whether there is possible black hole. The initial detection node sends a 
check packet to ask the cooperative node. If the inspection value is positive, the questionable node is 
regarded as a normal node. Otherwise the initial detection node starts the cooperative detection 
procedure, and deals with broadcasting and notifying all one-hop neighbours to participate in the 
decision making. Finally, the global reaction phase is executed to set up a notification system, and 
sends warning messages to the whole network. [9] Each node carries its own black hole list and 
transmission route in other mode. 
Delivery ratio ranges between 64.12 to 92.93% [9] when using different threshold values. 
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(iii) Hashed-based MAC and Hash-based PRF Scheme [9] 
 These two proposals (message authentication code (MAC) and the pseudo random function 
(PRF)) are used to prevent cooperative black-holes, seek collaborative malicious nodes and to provide 
fast message verification and group identification.   
The key point of this solution is that each node acquires a secret key Ki, and Ki = Gk (ri). The 
sharing key Ki is undisclosed to all other nodes, hence, it is formulated by choosing a random number 
ri and repeatedly applying PRF on ri by k times. When source node receives a packet, it checks Ki-d to 
find whether the key used for the MAC is disclosed or not, and checks the MAC when Ki is disclosed. 
[9]. If above two conditions will be passed, this packet would be considered as a secure. 
3.2.3 Gray-hole Attack  
 Instead of blindly dropping the all data packets as in Black-hole attack, the attacker selectively 
drops the packets originating from a single IP address/range of IP addresses and forwards the 
remaining packets (node dependent attack) or drops packets based on some predetermined/trigger 
time (time dependent attack). 
                    
    Pict. 4:  Sample of node dependent attack 
                   
                     
    Pict. 5: Sample of time dependent attack 
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Gray-hole has two major phases 
1. the malicious node accomplishes the AODV protocol to claim that it has the best valid 
route to destination node, with the intension of including or confusing the packets, 
even though route is fake 
2. the malicious nodes drop the irregular packets with a certain vision 
(i) Technique to detect grey-hole using DRI table [10] 
 The node that initiates the suspected node recognition procedure is known as the Initiator 
Node (IN). The IN first chooses a Cooperative Node (CN) in its region, based on its DRI records and 
broadcasts a RREQ message to only its 1-hop neighbours requesting for a route. [10] The IN will receive 
a number of RREP messages from its neighbours. One of the replies will be definitely a RREP message 
from the Suspected Node (SN). As RREP is received from the SN, the IN sends a query packet to the 
CN through the SN. After the time to live value of the query packet is over, the IN checks the CN 
whether it has received the query packet or not. [10] If the answer is positive, then the IN modifies its 
DRI table. However, if the query packet is found to be not reached to the CN, the IN increases its level 
of suspicion about the SN and starts the suspicious node recognition procedure. [10] 
(ii) Detection using credit based technique [10] 
 New algorithm was developed known as Credit Based AODV (CBAODV). Firstly, for every node 
is assigned a permanent value as the neighbour credit value. This credit value is increases by the 
protocol when it receives a route request packet (RREQ) and decreases when it receives the route 
reply (RREP) packet. [10] If this value finds negative value for one of the neighbour, it seems as the 
grey-hole attacker. This also removes all current established paths from its routing table which is going 
through that node. Each node assigns a credit value that we are sending the route request and 
subtracting the credit value when we got a reply from them. This algorithm is capable to detect 
cooperative grey-hole nodes. [10] 
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3.3 Control Traffic Attacks 
 In this chapter, we are going dealing with the right part of graph shown on picture 2. These 
attacks stand and fall by the fact that node, for successful attack, should be part of the network. 
Malicious node can easily disrupt the network by hijacking the routing tables, modifying the valid 
routes or in worse case, established itself as shortest route to any destination by utilizing the unsecure 
routing protocols. Using these kind of unsecure protocols is highly un-recommended by many network 
experts. 
3.3.1 HELLO flood  
 Some routing protocols require the nodes to announce themselves by broadcasting hello 
messages. If some node reaches this message it means that node is located within radio range of the 
sender. However, attacker can easily extend radio range by large enough transmission power and 
convince every other node in the network that the attacker is its neighbour. An attacker does not 
necessarily need to construct legitimate traffic in order to use the hello flood attack. It can simply re-
broadcast overhead packets with enough power to be received by every other node in the network. 
[20] 
(i) Signal strength technique [20] 
 Each node checks the signal strength of the received hello messages with respect to known 
radio range strength. If they are same then sender node is classified as a “friend” else sender is 
classified as a “stranger” [20] If the node appears as a “stranger”, technique called “client puzzles” is 
used to detect its validity, respectively possible threats (this technique will be discussed in next point 
(ii)).  
 Some primary assumption are- 
 Communication is within fixed radio range.  
 All sensor nodes in a fixed radio range have same transmitting and receiving signal 
strength. 
 All sensor nodes are homogeneous (same HW and SW, battery power etc.).  
 Every sensor node knows the fixed signal strength used in its communication range.  
 A time threshold is used, which denotes the expected time of reply message. 
 Hello message counter has been used by all sensors to keep the record of number of 
hello requests received in an allotted time. [20] 
   
    Pr= (Pt*Gt*Gr*Ht 2 *Hr 2)/(d4 *L)     (5) 
 Equation to calculate strength of the signal where Pr is received signal power (in watts), Pt is 
transmission power (in watts), Gt is the transmission antenna gain, Gr is the receiver antenna gain, Ht 
is the transmitter antenna height (in meter) and Hr is the receiving antenna height (in meter), d is the 
distance between transmitter and receiver (in meter), and L is the system loss (a constant). [20] 
 According to result from equation (5) shown above, the node is decided if is sender friend or 
not by simple following rule. The sender is considering as a friend as long as his fixed strength signal 
is equal to signal strength. However, if situation occur when strength signal is greater than fixed signal 
strength, the sender is labelled as a “stranger”. There may be a third option- the signal of received 
hello packet is approximately same, but no equal. To differentiate between a statement “friend” and 
“stranger” helps technique called “client puzzle”. 
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 The core idea of hello message based client puzzles scheme (MBCP) is that the larger the 
number of hello messages sent, the sender will have to solve more difficult puzzles. Hence the 
difficulty of puzzles for stranger will increase according to number of hello messages sent. [20] Each 
node counts number of received hello packets of allocated time and a puzzle generating capability. 
(ii) REHIDAN algorithm to identify flooding attacker nodes [21] 
 The Ad hoc On- Demand Distance Vector Routing protocol have the ability to forward the data 
packets in dynamic network topology, but it could not address all the possible attacks. To overcome 
the above problem, the Real-time Host Intrusion Detection for Ad hoc Networks (REHIDAN) algorithm 
to minimize the effectiveness of the attacks. Intrusion detection approach having the functions like 
Monitoring, analysing, assessing, recognizing, and tracking are examined by author. The REHIDAN 
algorithm uses the idea of neighbour suppression algorithm isolating through which, the attacker is 
isolated from the neighbour nodes. It is implemented, with OPNET. [21] 
3.3.2 Wormhole Attack 
 Base of this attack consist of two attacker nodes connected to each other via link. For clearly 
understanding, let’s name it as a tunnel. The both attacker node present in the network and wormhole 
nodes fake a route that is shorter than the original one within the network means it create illusion for 
the legitimate node so they believe that the route is shorter than the original one. [22] But this is not 
condition- wormhole fake path may be shorter as well. 
 Let’s take an example- we want to send packet over following topology from source node 3 
to destination node, which represents node number 7. The legitimate path would be path over nodes 
2, 6 and 5. However, after activation of malicious nodes, which create illusion shortest path to the 
destination, they will be able to catch and hear all of the communication. 
       
   Pict. 6: Sample of topology with indicated tunnel  
 The wormhole attack can be launched by given below modes they are listed below as [22]: 
 Packet Encapsulation or In-band Channel – in this mode, malicious node capture all 
of the packets from legitimate nodes, change header and send them to other attacker 
nodes. It can either drop the packet or forward to other nodes to other nodes which 
are present in the network 
 Out of Band Channel – connection between malicious node ensure the outer link with 
high bandwidth  
 High Power Transmission – attacker convince other nodes because he captures the 
packets and transmit them with higher transmission power. Whole traffic will pass 
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through this link and follow it, because legitimate nodes will consider this link as 
trustful 
 We can classify three kind of wormhole attack according to [22]: 
 Open Wormhole Attack identity of malicious nodes are included in header of 
packets and legitimate nodes are aware of the presence of the wormhole nodes. 
However, wormhole nodes may not be necessary be malicious and both attacker 
nodes are visible 
 Closed Wormhole Attack attacker don’t update info in header at the time of 
discover process, legitimate nodes are not aware of their presence. Packets are 
transmitting via tunnel and then either forward the packet or discard; here are 
attackers invisible for neighbours 
 Half Open Wormhole Attack this is combination of 2 mentioned option listed above- 
one of them is invisible and second one visible + it updates its identity in the packets 
 Detection technique of wormhole attacks: 
(i) Candidate Loop Selection [23] 
 After the shortest path tree is established, each node knows its shortest paths to the root 
node. The neighboring nodes exchange the information of their shortest paths. There are some pairs 
of nodes connected with each other but with their least common ancestor far away. [23] These nodes 
establish “cut pairs”. 2 shortest paths establish a loop and we qualify a candidate loop by setting a 
threshold on the length of the loop. The threshold depends on the expectation of the span of 
wormhole attacks, if we aim to detect all wormholes across h hop span, we can set the threshold to h 
hops [23] 
(ii) Geographical leashes & temporal leashes [8] 
 A leash is added to each packet in order to restrict the distance the packets are allowed to 
travel. A leash is associated with each hop. Thus, each transmission of a packet requires a new leash. 
A geographical leash is intended to limit the distance between the transmitter and the receiver of a 
packet. A temporal leash provides an upper bound on the lifetime of a packet. 
3.3.3 Rushing Attack 
 A rushing attacker exploits this duplicate suppression mechanism by quickly forwarding route 
discovery packets in order to gain access to the forwarding group. [24] When sender broadcast a RREQ 
(route request) message in neighbourhood and valid routes replies with RREP (route reply) contained 
route info. Some protocols use suppression mechanism in order to decrease the number of route 
requests and replies chatter. Rushing attacker quickly forwards with a malicious RREP on behalf of 
some other node skipping any proper processing. Due to duplicate suppression, actual valid RREP 
message from valid node will be discarded and consequently the attacking node becomes part of the 
route. In rushing attack, attacker node does send packets to proper node after its own filtering is done, 
so from outside the network behaves normally as if nothing happened. But it might increase the delay 
in packet delivering to destination node. [8] 
(i) Secure neighbour detection and secure route discovery procedure [24] 
 Generally, nodes broadcast message (Hello) to allow its neighbour to detect them. Secure 
neighbour detection relies on bidirectional link between two nodes. In those on-demand protocols, 
nodes who receive a route request consider itself the neighbour of previous-hop node. When a node 
transmit a request is claim a path between sender and receiver, but this secure neighbour detection 
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cannot prevent an attacker to receiving a request. [24] In the case, that previous node hasn’t been 
authorized and attacker took control over this node, it can claim to be any node propagating a request. 
Next hop node will trust this statement automatically. To prevent unsecure route discovery a 
randomized path selection technique is used.   
 In tradition way of route request, when the receiving node receive request it immediately 
forward the request. However, in modified approach, receiving node is waiting to collect all route 
requests, select some requests randomly and consequently chosen request will be forwarded.   
(ii) The concept of threshold [24] 
 Typical behaviour of attacker in the network is quickly forward RR packet or increase the 
transmission speed of packet. This cause that receiver receive this fast packet as first and legitimate 
RR packets will be discarded. Therefore, threshold value was invented, which says packets should be 
delivered to neighbour destination at fixed time interval. As a result, rushed packet reaches the node 
earlier than it’s given by threshold value and sender is labelled as an attacker. 
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4 Simulation in NS-3 
In this chapter, it will be shown how to create simple MANET network with several nodes and 
default setting. It will be explained the work of particular helpers, an impact of their settings on the 
topology.  
4.1 NS-3 simulator 
 NS-3 is a discrete-event network simulator in which the simulation core and models are 
implemented in C++. [5] It focused primarily on research and teaching. It is available for free and 
publicly available under the GNU GPLv2 license for research, development and use. First version (ns-
1) of NS simulator was released in 1995 and derived from an earlier simulator known as REAL by S. 
Keshav. NS-3 is not a backwards-compatible extension of NS-2. Infrastructure of NS-3 allows to 
simulate such as models, which should be aligned with the simulations needs of modern networking 
research. It is used to study system behaviour in a highly controlled, reproducible environment, and 
to learn about how networks work. Users will note that the available model set in ns-3 focuses on 
modelling how Internet protocols and networks work, but ns-3 is not limited to Internet systems. [3]  
Many simulations tools exist for exploring of network behaviour or protocols. I would like to 
highlight some distinguishing features in compare with other tools: 
 Using C++ programming language and its libraries that can combined together also 
with external software libraries 
 In this version of the software, integrated graphical user interface environment in 
which all tasks are indicated 
 Several external animators and data analysis and visualization tools can be used with 
ns-3 [3] 
 Ns-3 is running primarily on Linux systems, although some alternatives exist. Such as 
FreeBSD, Cygwin (for Windows) and native Windows Visual Studio (it is in the process 
of being developed) 
 NS-3 is not an officially supported software product of any company. Support for ns-
3 is done on a best-effort basis on the ns-3-users mailing list [3] 
              
    Pict. 7: Hierarchical structure of NS-3 simulator 
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4.2 Creating simple program 
Ns-3 is built as a system of software libraries work together. User programs can be written 
that links with (or imports from) these libraries. User programs are written in either the C++ or Python 
programming languages. Base of the program contains from the pre-built libraries, but at present, 
many users actually do their simulations by editing ns-3 itself. Because in some cases, pre-built 
libraries do not offer needed headers files. Whole program is allocated within the namespace (to 
distinguish classes with the same name), in this case ns3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In the next lines of the script are defined types of logging massages, which allows debug 
logging at the different levels. As a result, will be messages printing out by nodes, devices, protocols 
or applications as packets are coming through the topology and there exists several levels how deep 
we want to go. 
 
 
 
 
 
   NS_LOG_ERROR – error messages, 
   NS_LOG_WARN – warning messages, 
   NS_LOG_DEBUG – relatively rare, ad-hoc debugging messages, 
   NS_LOG_INFO – informational messages about program progress, 
   NS_LOG_FUNCTION – a message describing each function called, 
  NS_LOG_LOGIC – messages describing logical flow within a function,  
  NS_LOG_ALL – everything,  
We also provide an unconditional logging level that is always displayed, irrespective of logging 
levels or component selection [1] 
  NS_LOG_UNCOND – Log the associated message unconditionally. 
 
 
 
#include "ns3/core-module.h" 
#include "ns3/network-module.h" 
#include "ns3/internet-module.h" 
#include "ns3/point-to-point-module.h" 
#include "ns3/applications-module.h" 
 
using namespace ns3; 
 
LogComponentEnableAll (LOG_LEVEL_WARN); 
LogComponentEnable ("AodvRoutingProtocol", LOG_LEVEL_WARN); 
LogComponentEnable ("UdpEchoClientApplication", LOG_LEVEL_INFO); 
LogComponentEnable ("UdpEchoServerApplication", LOG_LEVEL_INFO); 
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Next two lines of code will actually create the ns3- nodes. Using the NodeContainer helper is 
the simplest way how to add nodes to our topology. However, the previous command creates only 
empty container. Therefore, we have to fulfil it by adding two nodes. In order to wireless 
communication works properly, we should follow the rules about nodes layout and set up them in a 
smaller distance. Otherwise, a compilator could throws error. Using following attributes, we set the 
size of the grid. 
  GridWidth : The number of objects layed out on a line  
  MinX,MinY : The x/y coordinate where the grid starts  
  DeltaX, DeltaY : The x/y space between objects  
  LayoutType : The type of layout [2] 
Applying the mobility model is not goal, therefore we have arranged the nodes on constant 
positions using ConstantPositionMobilityModel command. NetdeviceContainer topology helper is 
needed for installing the wireless technology on the devices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With NqosWifiMacHelper, YansWifiPhyHelper, YansWifiChannelHelper we adjust necessary 
parameters for properly working of WifiHelper. Once the PHY and MAC helpers are configured, 
channel is going to be created by command Install with attributes given from previous helpers. The 
SetRemoteStationManager method tells the helper the type of rate control algorithm to use [3]. 
NodeContainer nodes; 
nodes.Create (8); 
 
MobilityHelper mobility 
mobility.SetPositionAllocator("ns3::GridPositionAllocator", 
 "MinX", DoubleValue (20.0), 
 "MinY", DoubleValue (100.0), 
 "DeltaX", DoubleValue(100), 
 "DeltaY", DoubleValue (100), 
 "GridWidth", UintegerValue(3), 
 "LayoutType", StringValue ("RowFirst")); 
 
  mobility.SetMobilityModel ("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel"); 
  mobility.Install (nodes); 
NetDeviceContainer devices; 
 
NqosWifiMacHelper wifiMac = NqosWifiMacHelper::Default (); 
wifiMac.SetType ("ns3::AdhocWifiMac"); 
YansWifiPhyHelper wifiPhy = YansWifiPhyHelper :: Default(); 
YansWifiChannelHelper wifiChannel = YansWifiChannelHelper :: Default (); 
wifiPhy.SetChannel (wifiChannel.Create ()); 
 
WifiHelper wifi = WifiHelper :: Default (); 
wifi.SetRemoteStationManager ("ns3::ConstantRateWifiManager", "DataMode", StringValue  
"OfdmRate6Mbps"), "RtsCtsThreshold", UintegerValue (0)); 
devices = wifi.Install (wifiPhy, wifiMac,nodes); 
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We will use InternetStackHelper to install the chosen protocol for ad hoc networks- AODV and 
subsequently, apply it on the nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Here is shown using command Ipv4AddressHelper to assign IP address to device ‘s interfaces. 
Firstly, we initialize an address range. Then the interfaces of devices will be associated with IP 
addresses from network number 192.168.0.0 in this case, as seen above. System does it automatically 
and there is no option how to assign specific address on chosen interface. By default, the address 
allocation starts at the lowest possible address and increase monotonically. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the core abstractions of the ns-3 system is the Application. In this script we use two 
specializations of the core ns-3 class Application called UdpEchoServerApplication and 
UdpEchoClientApplication [3]. They are used to generate and echo simulated network packets. With 
this combination of attributes, echo client sends one 1024- bytes packet every 1 second to port 9. IP 
address corresponds to zeroth interface in the nodes container. Then, it is needed to install, both, 
server and client on the specific nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 AodvHelper Aodv; 
 InternetStackHelper stack; 
 stack.SetRoutingHelper (Aodv); 
 stack.Install (nodes); 
Ipv4InterfaceContainer interfaces ; 
 
Ipv4AddressHelper address; 
address.SetBase ("192.168.0.0", "255.255.255.0"); 
interfaces = address.Assign (devices); 
UdpEchoServerHelper echoServer (9); 
 
ApplicationContainer serverApps = echoServer.Install (nodes.Get (0)); 
serverApps.Start (Seconds (1.0)); 
serverApps.Stop (Seconds (10.0)); 
    
UdpEchoClientHelper echoClient (interfaces.GetAddress (0), 9); 
echoClient.SetAttribute ("MaxPackets", UintegerValue (10)); 
echoClient.SetAttribute ("Interval", TimeValue (Seconds (1.0))); 
echoClient.SetAttribute ("PacketSize", UintegerValue (1024)); 
 
ApplicationContainer clientApps1 = echoClient.Install (nodes.Get (9)); 
clientApps1.Start (Seconds (2.0)); 
clientApps1.Stop (Seconds (10.0)); 
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AnimationInterface command (available as a standard in NS-3 with ns-3.20 version or higher) 
allows us animate packets, view the statistics, filtering the traffic data, etc. It will be more explained 
in the further chapters. When Simulator::Run() is called, the system will begin looking through the list 
of scheduled events and executing them. [3] For instance, scheduled starts events, which will enable 
the echo server application and client application. We have to make sure, that definition for stopping 
the simulation is written before the run command.   Otherwise, it may happen that the simulation will 
never end. Cleaning up the remains (destroying all of the objects that were created) is done by calling 
the function Simulator::Destroy().  
For building the scripts exists many tools, the most widespread is make. However, It’s use is 
not recommended, especially in complex and highly configurable topologies. Therefore, NS-3 has 
developed an alternative- waf (based on Python language). Type the following command in the 
terminal: 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Gaining results and topology 
  
 In the first lines of our code are declared logging messages, which enable us to discover the 
results. In our example, UdpEchoClientApplication and UdpEchoServerApplication are used, therefore 
we set up logging message on the level INFO. 
 
 
   Pict. 8: Output shown in terminal after running the program 
  
As we can see, logging message on the echo client indicate that it has sent 1024 bytes’ packet to the 
address 192.168.0.1 assigned to the server on the port 9. Attributes, as a size of packets and number 
of the destination port were chosen by us, but assigning the address is automatic process and we 
cannot influence that. Server echoes the packet to the address 192.168.0.10 on the port 49153 and 
you see the echo client log that it has received its packet back from the server. Whole communication 
took little more than 0.1 second. 
 Next option how to examine the results is an implementation of trace files. The ns-3 helper 
enablePcap is used to create these files in .pcap format. Output can be written by the most popular 
traffic analyser- Wireshark (formerly called Ethereal) with options as a graphical user interface, used 
protocols or simply by using tcpdump.  
Capturing the packets info will be enabled by typing the following command: 
 
 
AnimationInterface anim ("mojProjektVizualizacia.xml"); 
Simulator::Stop (Seconds(10)); 
 
Simulator::Run (); 
Simulator::Destroy (); 
return 0; 
./waf --run scratch/first  
wifiPhy.EnablePcapAll("myFirst"); 
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The pcap helper will actually create files named „myFirst-0-0.pcap“, and „myFirst-1-0.pcap“  
located in the scratch file. First zero represents the number of node and second zero is a device. For 
reading output with tcpdumb, what is actually the easiest way to look the pcap file, type to terminal: 
 
 
 
Next option how to trace packets is printing out the routing tables. As a result of following 
commands is the file blackHole.routes located in the scratch file with tabular and detailed information 
such as destination IP address, gateway, outgoing interface, flags, expire time and number of hops for 
every node separately. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As a sample was chosen the routing table of node 1 from blackhole topology at the time 2 
seconds. As we can see, there are saved only those destination IP addresses nodes that were used for 
routing. 
 
 
  Pict. 9: Routing table after running sample program 
 
As was mentioned above, for visualization is employed by software NetAnim (Network 
Animator), which works with .xml files. After the successful launch of the application, a file named 
"mojProjektVizualizacia.xml" will be created. For calling the NetAnim program is used the following 
command. Sample of graphical user interface is shown on the picture number 2. 
 
 
 
For demonstration will be used the topology corresponding to actual topology for simulating 
the black-hole attack. 
 
$ tcpdump -nn -tt -r myFirst-0-0.pcap 
Ptr<OutputStreamWrapper> routingStream = Create<OutputStreamWrapper>   
("blackHole.routes", std::ios::out); 
Aodv.PrintRoutingTableAllAt (Seconds (4), routingStream);  
denis@denis-VirtualBox:~/Desktop/ns-allinone-3.21/netanim-3.105$ ./NetAnim 
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    Pict. 10: Visualization of sample topology 
 
 The topology consists of 10 nodes, with following attributes: 
 nodes are divided into one rectangle 2x3 and one line of 4 nodes 
 they are 100 metres apart from each other, in the vertical and horizontal way 
 node 1 represents the server and node 9 represents echo client 
 static positions, no motion model wasn’t applied 
  
 I have chosen this layout because of only one way how to get from server to the destination. 
That is necessary for observation the behaviour of the black-hole and the grey-hole attacks where only 
one possible way is needed. 
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5 Threats effects 
 In this chapter are listed several examples of attacks in MANET network and their influence 
on continuity of flowing of the packets. 
5.1 Black-hole attack 
5.1.1 Black-Hole implementation 
 Black-hole attack belongs to the group of basic assaults based on influencing data traffic. In 
this demonstration will be implemented a solution, when we set down the node number 7 in the time 
4 seconds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Calling this extension is made by command prompt with following command: 
 
     Pict. 11: Calling BH extension 
 For calling the function SetDown is needed an attribute such as a number of interfaces. 
However, we must associate node to the object, because the function Simulator::Schedule requests 
the objects. Firstly, we create a pointer for the node number 7 called nod and subsequently, we create 
next pointer to the object of ipv4 interface called nmbNode. The ipv4ifIndex command is required for 
the function Simulator::Schedule, but I haven’t found the purpose of that. The first ifIndex is 0 for 
loopback, then the first p2p is numbered 1, then the next p2p is numbered 2. 
 
   Pict. 12: Output in terminal after running black-hole attack  
 As we can see, the bidirectional communication between the server and the client works 
properly until 4 second.  Client and server sent and received packets without any changes. However, 
after the activation of a malicious node in the time 4 second every packets, which were sent to this 
node, were dropped. The client is trying to reach the server every one second, but the packets will 
never get further than to the node 7. 
if (BH)  
 { 
Ptr<Node> nod = nodes.Get (7); 
Ptr<Ipv4> nmbNode = nod->GetObject<Ipv4> (); 
uint32_t ipv4ifIndex = 1; 
Simulator::Schedule (Seconds (4), &Ipv4::SetDown, nmbNode, ipv4ifIndex); 
} 
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 As is shown on the picture below, after the update the routing tables at the time 9 seconds 
(AODV routing protocol rely on sending HELLO messages every few seconds), nodes, located on the 
left from the malicious node, realized that interfaces, which they were trying to reach, were 
unavailable. Therefore, they set up corresponding flags to state “down”.   
 
 As a sample have been chosen the node 6’s routing tables with IP address 192.168.0.7 before 
update the routes and after. 
 destination  – destination IP address, IP address 192.168.0.255 serves as a broad-
     cast address to explore neighbours or to find a best path 
 gateway  – next hop IP address 
 interface – IP address of given node (IP address 127.0.0.1 serves as a loopback 
     address for testing the functionality of the interface, it has no   
     hardware associated with it and it isn’t physically connected to a 
     network) 
 flag  – availability of the destination node 
 expire   – remaining time (in seconds) to resend HELLO packets 
 hops   – number of nodes to reach a given destination node 
 In the following pictures, we can observe the difference between the routing tables in 6. 
second and 7. second. Shortly after the expiration of 6 seconds the time for resend HELLO message 
expires and routing tables are updated. 
 
 
  Pict. 13: Node 6’s routing table in time 6 sec. after running black-hole attack 
 
  Pict. 14: Node 6’s routing table in time 7 sec. after running black-hole attack  
 The widespread software Shark will serve us for another sample of black-hole network attack 
impact. I have chosen this SW for decoding the PCAP files generated by every node. In network 
terminology, PCAP originated as an abbreviation from “packet capture”. In the field of computer 
network administration, PCAP consists of an application programming interface (API) for capturing 
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network traffic. Unix-like systems implement PCAP in the libpcap library; Windows uses a port of 
libpcap known as WinPcap. Monitoring software may use libpcap and/or WinPcap to capture packets 
travelling over a network.  [28] 
   
 
   Pict. 15: Node 6’s PCAP file without active black-hole attack 
 
   Pict. 16: Node 6’s PCAP file with active black-hole attack in 4. sec. 
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 As we can see on the attached pictures above of PCAP files of node num. 6 the differences 
are quite obvious. Without active black-hole attack, the node number 0 is forwarding UDP packets to 
the destination node to the port 9 at interval every one second (as was set in the source code). 
 
 After activation BH in the time 4 seconds, we can observe destination non availability- AODV 
protocol is searching and trying to reach destination via alternative route, but without success.  
5.1.2 Mitigating the impact of the black-hole   
 Firstly, I would recommend to find more than 1 path to the destination, however in our case, 
there doesn’t exist any redundant way how to reach destination node. Therefore, I would select the 
last-packet-sequence-number solution, which was mentioned above. It’s needed just carry two more 
values in the tables for comparison. From my point of view, it seems to be simplest solution in regard 
to the given topology. It produces less service messages (RREP and RREQ) than AODV protocol and 
communication overhead can be reduced by proper the inbound cryptography method.  
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5.2 Grayhole attack 
5.2.1 Grayhole implementation 
 For simulating gray-hole attack was used different layout scheme described by following 
“mobility” code: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This code leads to graphical output as shown below. 
 
    Pict. 17: Topology used in gray-hole attack 
 
mobility.SetPositionAllocator("ns3::GridPositionAllocator", 
    "MinX", DoubleValue (22.0), 
    "MinY", DoubleValue (40.0), 
    "DeltaX", DoubleValue(50), 
    "DeltaY", DoubleValue (50), 
    "GridWidth", UintegerValue(3), 
    "LayoutType", StringValue ("RowFirst")); 
mobility.SetMobilityModel ("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel"); 
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 Grayhole could be implemented in two ways:  
 Node dependent attack - drops DATA packets destined towards a certain victim node 
or coming from certain node, while for other nodes it behaves normally by routing 
DATA packets to the destination nodes correctly [8] 
 Time dependent attack - Time dependent attack – drops DATA packets based on some 
predetermined/trigger time while behaving normally during the other instances [8] 
 I have chosen the node dependent attack (because of the more complicated implementation 
in compare to time dependent attack), which is executed by following code:  
I have chosen the node dependent attack, which is executed by following code 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 There are certain factory objects that can create sockets. Each factory is capable of creating 
one type of socket, and if sockets of a particular type are able to be created on a given node, then a 
factory that can create such sockets must be aggregated to the node c.Get(5).[25] Class TypeId was 
called as a unique identifier for an interface. This class records a lot of meta-information about a 
subclass of the object base class as the base class of the subclass, the set of accessible constructors in 
the subclass or the set of 'attributes' accessible in the subclass. Examples of TypeIds to pass to this 
method are ns3::TcpSocketFactory, ns3::PacketSocketFactory, and ns3::UdpSocketFactory. 
 In following lines were established smart pointers to sockets objects called “receiver” and 
“middle”, which create sockets on the interface number 5: c.Get(5) and number 4 (this refers to the 
nodes nr. 5 and 4 in the layout above). InetSocketAddress class holds an Ipv4Address and a port 
number to form an ipv4 transport endpoint. In our case, the both receiver nodes works on port 80 and 
IP address is obtained by calling function GetAddress() with number of interface over the list 
ipInterface.  
 Sending a socket through the network require these following steps [26]: 
 Bind() - allocate a local IPv4 endpoint for this socket 
 Connect() - initiate a connection to a remote host 
 Send()- send data (or dummy data) to the remote host 
 Recv()- read data from the socket (on the remote side) 
 Close()- close a socket 
 
 
 
| 
  TypeId tid = TypeId::LookupByName ("ns3::UdpSocketFactory"); 
  Ptr<Socket> receiver = Socket::CreateSocket (c.Get (5), tid); 
  InetSocketAddress local = InetSocketAddress  ( ipInterfaces.GetAddress(5), 80); 
  receiver->Bind (local); 
 
  Ptr<Socket> middle = Socket::CreateSocket (c.Get (4), tid); 
  InetSocketAddress mid = InetSocketAddress  ( ipInterfaces.GetAddress(4), 80); 
  middle->Bind (mid); 
  Ptr<Socket> source=Socket::CreateSocket(c.Get(0),tid);  
  Ptr<Socket> source2=Socket::CreateSocket(c.Get(6),tid);  
  source  ->Connect (mid); 
  source2->Connect (mid); 
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 Smart socket pointer “source” and “source2” are established on the node nr. 0 and nr. 6 and 
subsequently are connected to “mid” address (reason, why exactly this nodes, will be explained later 
in this chapter).  
 
 
  
 SetRecvCallback function throw notification when new data is available to be read. As an 
attribute of the function is Makecallback. What is obvious, the goal is to allow one piece of code to 
call a function without any specific inter-module dependency. The function ReceivePacket and 
GrayHole are mentioned below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 As the third step (after the allocation IP addresses and initiation the connection) is to send the 
packet with defined the size of payload as 100 (but it’s completely up to user). In the example, I am 
trying to send 10 packets from two different sources, however command send is unable to forward 
more than 3 packets from the same source node. The same result occurred even when I changed the 
duration of the whole simulation.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Firstly, GrayHole void function is called with defined local address “from”, which refers to IP 
address of received socket. We obtain it by calling the function RecvFrom. As a next step, this address 
is transformed to InetSocketAddress by function ConvertFrom with “from” address as an input. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  receiver1-> SetRecvCallback (MakeCallback (&ReceivePacket)); 
  middle    -> SetRecvCallback (MakeCallback (&GrayHole)); 
  for( int a = 1; a < 10; a = a + 1 ) 
  { 
   source  -> Send(Create<Packet> (100)); 
   source2-> Send(Create<Packet> (100)); 
  } 
void GrayHole (Ptr<Socket> socket) 
{ 
  Address from; 
  Ptr<Packet> packet= Create <Packet> (100); 
  socket->RecvFrom (from); 
  InetSocketAddress senAddr = InetSocketAddress::ConvertFrom (from);  
 
   
  if (senAddr.GetIpv4() == "192.168.0.1")  { 
   std::cout<<"Paket s zdroj. adr. 192.168.0.1 bol zachyteny a zahodeny\n"; 
  } 
  else  { 
  std::cout<< "Paket s zdroj. adr.: " << senAddr.GetIpv4() <<  
     " bol preposlany\n"; 
   InetSocketAddress remote = InetSocketAddress ("192.168.0.6", 80); 
   socket->Connect (remote); 
   socket->Send(packet); 
  } 
} 
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 As it is obvious from the code, if the sender address matches to IP “192.168.0.1”, the packet 
will be dropped as a result of gray-hole attack. If not, the packet will be forward to remote destination 
IP address “192.168.0.6” on the port 80.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If the packet passes the test and its destination address is not equal “192.168.0.1”, packet will 
be forward to the node (in our case called “receiver”). I should mention the fact that gray-hole node 
works as a particular server node with own address and not as flown control mechanism. This causes 
all of the forwarded packets arrive to destination with source IP address of the malicious node- 
192.168.0.5 and not with address of accurate sender node. After running the program, output will 
look as follows: 
 
             Pict. 18: Output after running gray-hole attack 
  
 
    Pict. 19: Captured PCAP file of node num. 5   
  
void ReceivePacket (Ptr<Socket> socket){ 
  Address from; 
  socket->RecvFrom (from); 
  InetSocketAddress senAddr = InetSocketAddress::ConvertFrom (from); //zdrojova adresa 
 
  std::cout<<"Paket s zdroj. adr.: " << senAddr.GetIpv4() <<  
    " bol prijaty v cieli\n"; 
} 
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 Attached picture above shows the captured QUIC packets over the network, which represent 
packets manually created in the code. QUIC protocol (Quick UDP Internet Connections) supports a set 
of multiplexed connections between two endpoints over User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and was 
designed to provide security protection equivalent to TLS/SSL, along with reduced connection and 
transport latency, and bandwidth estimation in each direction to avoid congestion. [29]  
 
5.2.2 Mitigating the impact of the gray-hole 
 One of the technique proposed by Jaydeep Sen based on alarm and exploring alternative 
neighbour paths. Once a node is detected to be really malicious, the scheme has a notification 
mechanism [Alarm Message] for sending messages to all the nodes that are not yet suspected to be 
malicious, so that the malicious node can be isolated and not allowed to use any network resources. 
[27] The mechanism consists of four security procedures which are invoked sequentially. Procedures 
consists of several steps: 
 Neighbourhood data collection 
 Local anomaly detection 
 Cooperative anomaly detection 
 Global alarm raiser 
 Malicious node stays isolated from the network by resending the alarm messages which can 
lead to overhead in the network. They provide a solution which can overcome the overhead of 
network caused by source node who send alarm message to all the other node about the gray-hole 
node. The complete work concludes that, proposed solution will be based on above explained 
technique and try to improve network performance. [27] 
 
  
44 
 
Conclusion 
 In this thesis were shown samples of simple topology with the implementation of AODV 
routing protocol that was chosen with respect to the size of the network and also a visualization of 
the topology in the additional program NetAnim. 
 According to the obtained results, we can say that simulating the black-hole attack via setting 
the malicious node down is not properly way. Because the black-hole should behave as a normal node 
for its neighbours and blindly drop the packets after obtaining. This option was chosen by reason of 
impossibility of implementing the command SetForwarding. If we don’t take into account the routing 
tables, where some nodes occurred with the flag “down”, we can observe the same result- dropping 
all of the incoming packets. Also, it was proposed a solution for eliminating the influence of the black-
hole. 
 As regards the gray-hole, my focus was aimed to develop appropriate model of GH in source 
code. I have chosen the variant „node dependency“ attack where packets are filtering by IP address 
or port. Since I did not find functional method how to implement flow control of traffic generated by 
applications, I was forced to look at the packets as objects, generate them manually and check a match 
in the middle node. As a result, output doesn’t refer to original approach of GH. Anyway, take this 
thesis as my own implementation of GH. 
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List of used abbreviations 
 AODV   Ad-hoc on demand distance vector 
 CTS   Clear-to-send 
 RTS   Request-to-send 
 Manet   Mobile ad-hoc network 
 MPR   Multipoint relays 
 OLSR   Optimized link-state routing 
 ZRP   Zone Routing Protocol 
 QoS  Quality of Service 
 RERR  Route error 
 RREP  Route reply 
 RREQ  Route request 
 TCP   Transimission control protocol 
 BRP   Broadcast Resolution Protocol 
 IERP   Inter Zone Routing Protocol 
 MAC  Media access control 
 XML   eXtensible Markup Language 
 PCAP   Packet capture 
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List of appendixes 
 A CDROM 
  A.1 Black-hole source code (.cc extension) 
  A.2 Gray-hole source code (.cc extension) 
